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Interest in the evolutionary origins and drivers of warfare in ancient and con-
temporary small-scale human societies has greatly increased in the last decade,
and has been particularly spurred by exciting archaeological discoveries that
suggest our ancestors led more violent lives than previously documented.
However, the striking observation that warfare is an almost-exclusively male
activity remains unexplained. Three general hypotheses have been proposed,
concerning greater male effectiveness in warfare, lower male costs, and
patrilocality. But while each of these factors might explain why warfare is
more common in men, they do not convincingly explain why women
almost never participate. Here, we develop a mathematical model to formally
assess these hypotheses. Surprisingly, we find that exclusively male warfare
may evolve even in the absence of any such sex differences, though sex
biases in these parameters can make this evolutionary outcome more likely.
The qualitative observation that participation in warfare is almost exclusive
to one sex is ultimately explained by the fundamentally sex-specific nature
of Darwinian competition—in fitness terms, men compete with men and
women with women. These results reveal a potentially key role for ancestral
conditions in shaping our species’ patterns of sexual division of labour and
violence-related adaptations and behavioural disorders.1. Introduction
Recent contributions from multiple disciplines—including archaeology, psy-
chology, evolutionary biology, and anthropology—have greatly deepened our
understanding of warfare, which may be broadly defined as coalitionary inter-
group aggression [1–28]. However, the extreme sex difference in individuals’
involvement in warfare remains unexplained. In our evolutionary past, warfare
was mainly—most likely, almost-exclusively—a male pursuit, as revealed by
major discoveries of prehistoric mass graves and other material evidence of
lethal intergroup conflict [24,26,27,29,30]. Similarly, in the vast majority of his-
torical and contemporary hunter–gatherer and small-scale societies, women
have only rarely participated in warfare in a direct way—i.e. in fighting—and
their usual role, if any, has been a supporting one [4,9,17,29,31–35]. This
strong sex difference is also observed in chimpanzees, which are our closest
living relatives and are understood to be the only other primates that routinely
engage in lethal intergroup conflict [11,36,37]. On the face of it, this pattern is
puzzling because, if likelihood of success in warfare increases with the size of
the war party, it is unclear why more than half of a group’s potential warriors
would almost always fail to participate in battle. The puzzle is not why male
participation in warfare is more common than female participation (we outline
potential explanations for this directly below), but why this imbalance is
commonly so extreme, i.e. women taking no part at all.
Three general non-mutually exclusive hypotheses have been offered to explain
this male bias in propensity to take part in warfare, and no general consensus has
been reached. First,menmight be predisposed towarfare because they are better at
it. Specifically, having greater weight, height, and muscle mass may allow most
men to perform more effectively in battle than most women [31]. Second, the
net cost of warfare may be lower for men than women. In particular, while
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offset by a surviving warrior achieving great mating success,
this is more likely to be true for men than for women owing
to the way that male fitness can scale almost indefinitely
with mating success, while female fitness has natural limits
[9,17,31,38,39]. Also, the costs of participation in warfare are
likely to be greater for women on account of the possibility of
being pregnant or lactating, offspring survival being more
strongly dependent on the continued presence of the mother
than the father, sexual division of labour, and central place fora-
ging leading to the opportunity costs of travelling being greater
for women (e.g. [40]), and finally the risk of sexual coercion in
case of defeat [9,31,41]. Third, women may be relatively
less incentivized to participate in warfare owing to female-
biased dispersal being associated with their having lower
kinship to those group mates who stand to benefit in the
event of success in warfare [36,38]. Female-biased dispersal
(patrilocality) has been suggested to characterize ancestral
humans [42] (but see [43]) and contemporary hunter–gatherers
[44] (but see [45,46]), and is also observed in chimpanzees [47],
in striking contradistinction to the usual mammalian syndrome
of male-biased dispersal [48,49].
To formally assess the feasibility of these three hypotheses,
and to explore how readily they explain extreme sex bias in par-
ticipation in warfare—in terms of whether such sex differences
are necessary and sufficient for exclusively male warfare
to evolve—we extend an existing kin-selection model of exclu-
sively male warfare [7,23] to incorporate participation by both
men and women. We assume an infinite, group-structured
population in which individuals disperse between groups
with sex-specific probabilities, and then engage in warfare
against other groups, with individual and group participation
in warfare influencing the likelihood of enjoying reproductive
success in one’s own group and also in defeated groups (see
Methods and electronic supplementary material for details).
We use this model to investigate how natural selection might
act to favour or disfavour male and/or female participation
in warfare in the presence and absence of the previously
hypothesized basic underlying sex differences. However, our
key aim is to determine the conditions underwhich exclusively
male participation in warfare might be expected to emerge as a
stable evolutionary outcome.2. Methods
We adapt and expand an existingmodel of exclusivelymale partici-
pation inwarfare [7,23] so as to allow consideration of participation
by both sexes. Specifically, we consider two coevolving traits: the
tendency for a man to participate in war—i.e. the probability of
joining the war party during either attack or defence—which we
term male participation (Vm), and the tendency for a woman to
participate, whichwe term female participation (Vf ). Here, ‘partici-
pation’ is equivalent to the ‘bravery’ behaviour described in the
exclusivelymalewarfare versions of themodel [7,23] (see electronic
supplementary material for details). In the model, war is broadly
construed so as to include, for example, surprise attacks as well
as pitched battles. It is defined as an agonistic interaction between
two groups, in which a subset of individuals of each group
cooperate and coordinate to seize reproductive opportunities
from the other group, as detailed below.
We consider an infinite population consisting of groups of Ni
adults of sex i [ fm, fg. In the first step of the life cycle,
each woman produces a large number Ki of sex-i offspring, who
grow to become young adults (following [7,23], we assumenon-overlapping generations, so that only young adult individ-
uals—hereafter ‘individuals’—have the opportunity to migrate,
fight and reproduce in each generation). Each sex-i individual
migrates to a randomly chosen group with probability mi.
In every generation, each post-migration group can attack one
randomly chosen group, with probability a, and can be attacked
by one other group, with the same probability a. If a war is
initiated, a war party is formed in each of the two groups:
each sex-i individual joins with probability Vi. The attacking
group wins with probability vðVm,att, Vf,att, Vm,def, Vf,defÞ, where
Vi,att, and Vi,def are the average probabilities of participation
of sex-i individuals in the attacking and defending groups,
respectively; and @vðVm,att, Vf,att, Vm,def, Vf,defÞ=@Vi,att ¼ bi
is the marginal increase in the probability of the attacking group
winning, contributed by participation of sex i [ fm, fg (we
assume that participation has equal importance in defence:
@vðVm,att, Vf,att, Vm,def, Vf,defÞ=@Vi,def ¼ bi). Density-dependent
competition follows warfare. In groups that were not attacked,
individuals compete for reproductive opportunities against
groupmates of the same sex; in groups that were attacked and suc-
cessfully defended, individuals compete for reproductive
opportunities against group mates of the same sex, with sex-i
individuals having competitiveness ti(Vi,ind)—where Vi,ind is the
probability of participation of a sex-i individual, and
ð@tiðVi,indÞ=@Vi,indÞ=ti( Vi)¼ ci is the competitive cost of
participation for an individual of sex i; and in defeated groups,
individuals compete for reproductive opportunities against
group mates and attackers of the same sex, with sex-i individuals
having competitiveness tiðVi,indÞ  si if they belong to the defeated
group, and ti(Vi,ind)  ð1 siÞ if they belong to the winning group.
Notice that participation comes into play and incurs a competitive
cost only when a group is involved in a war, either because it
attacks or is attacked by another group.We perform a kin-selection
analysis [50–57] to determine how selection acts upon male par-
ticipation and female participation in warfare (see electronic
supplementary material for details).3. Results
Analysing our model, we find that natural selection—includ-
ing both direct and indirect (i.e. kin selection) effects
[50–57]—favours an increase in participation in warfare by
an individual of sex i when
ci þ ð1 2vsið1 siÞÞcirii þ 2ðð1 siÞrii þ ð1 sjÞrijÞbi . 0,
ð3:1Þ
where ci is the marginal cost of participation for that individ-
ual, bi is the marginal increase in the probability of their
group’s victory, v is the population-average probability of
an attacking group being victorious, si is the proportion of
children born into defeated groups whose sex-i parent was
a member of the defeated—rather than a winning—group,
rii is the genetic relatedness of same-sex group mates, and
rij is the relatedness of opposite-sex group mates (both
being lower than relatedness to self, which generates a collec-
tive action problem with tension between individual versus
group interests). That is, by participating in warfare, an indi-
vidual of sex i incurs: a direct-fitness cost (first term in
condition (1)), owing to a loss 2ci of reproductive opportu-
nities; an indirect-fitness benefit (second term), owing to a
corresponding increase ci of reproductive opportunities for
other same-sex individuals, who are group mates with prob-
ability ð1 2vsið1 siÞÞci and in which case are related by rii;
and an indirect-fitness benefit (third term), from improving
the group’s success in warfare by bi and consequently
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Figure 1. Evolution of male and female participation in the absence of other sex differences in the ecology of war. Streamline plots showing the evolution of male
and female participation in warfare ð Vm, VfÞ with accelerating personal costs (a) and with decelerating personal costs (b). Filled red circles represent stable
equilibria and circled blue dots represent unstable equilibria. For the purposes of illustration, we assume competitiveness functional forms ti ¼ 1–xiV2i (a),
and ti ¼ 1–xiV1=2i (b), and a symmetrical war outcome function v(satt,sdef ) ¼ satt=ðsatt þ sdefÞ, where satt ¼ 1=2ðcmVm,att þ cfVf,attÞ and
sdef ¼ 1=2ðcmVm,def þ cfVf,defÞ are the fighting strengths of the attacker and the defender, respectively (see electronic supplementary material for details),
with cf ¼ cm ¼ 1 and xf ¼ xm ¼ 0.12. Other parameter values are v ¼ 0:5, a ¼ 1, Nf ¼ Nm ¼ 10, mm ¼ mf ¼ 0.5, sf ¼ sm ¼ 0.15. (Online version
in colour.)
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mates—who are related by rii—by a factor 12 si and that
of opposite-sex group mates—who are related by rij—by a
factor 12 sj. Note that condition (1) holds even when individ-
uals gain a direct fitness benefit from participating (ci, 0; see
electronic supplementary material for details), such as high
prestige leading to increased mating success or other fitness-
enhancing benefits [16,17], and may thus be satisfied even
when group mates are not genetically related.
To explore whether underlying sex differences are necess-
ary for driving the evolution of single-sex participation, or
whether this might occur for more basic reasons, we investi-
gate the behaviour of our model in the simple, hypothetical
case where these sex differences are absent. Consideration
of condition (1) reveals that, even if there is no sex bias in
any parameter and initially equal participation of both
sexes in warfare (cm ¼ cf ¼ c, bm ¼ bf ¼ b, mm ¼ mf ¼ m,
sm ¼ sf ¼ s), evolution may nevertheless result in single-sex
participation in warfare, on account of a feedback that
occurs within each sex. Specifically, the direct cost of partici-
pation in warfare manifests as a reduction in competitiveness
against same-sex individuals for reproductive opportunities,
and we find that if this marginal cost increases with increas-
ing level of participation by members of one’s own sex
(‘accelerating cost’; @ci=@ Vi . 0, where Vi is the average
level of participation in warfare by individuals of sex i),
then the two sexes are favoured to participate equally
(figure 1a), whereas if the marginal cost of participation
decreases with increasing level of participation by members
of one’s own sex (‘decelerating cost’; @ci=@ Vi , 0), then
single-sex participation is favoured (figure 1b). If constraints
prevent a favoured increase in participation from one sex
from being evolutionarily realized—for example, if that sex
is already fully participating in warfare—then this may lead
to the other sex also participating in warfare in compensation.Hence, if the cost of participation is decelerating, any initial
symmetry-breaking sex bias in participation is expected to
become evolutionarily magnified, such that whether the
population evolves male-only or female-only participation
depends only on the initial conditions (i.e. ‘hysteresis’).
This result reveals a fundamental role for sex in modulat-
ing selection pressures in relation to warfare such that—even
in the absence of any other sex differences—the incentive for
an individual to join a war party depends not only on how
much other individuals are participating, but also on the indi-
vidual’s own sex and the sex of those other participating
individuals. Specifically, an increased level of participation
in warfare by sex-i individuals increases the incentive of a
focal individual of the same sex to join the war party if
4ð1 sÞr @bi
@ Vi
 ð1 ð1 2vsð1 sÞÞrÞ @ci
@ Vi
. 0, ð3:2Þ
whereas it increases the incentive of a focal individual of the
other sex to join the war party if
4ð1 sÞr @bj
@ Vi
. 0 ð3:3Þ
(see electronic supplementary material for details). In particu-
lar: if cost is accelerating ð@ci=@ Vi . 0Þ, then the focal
individual is relatively disincentivized to participate in war-
fare when same-sex individuals are already participating,
leading to equal participation by both sexes being favoured
(figure 1a); and if cost is decelerating ð@ci=@ Vi , 0Þ, then
the focal individual is relatively incentivized to participate
in warfare when same-sex individuals are already participat-
ing, leading to only one sex being favoured to participate in
warfare (figure 1b).
These results explain why participation in warfare may
involve one sex only, but not why participation in warfare
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Figure 2. Evolution of male and female participation in the context of other sex differences in the ecology of war. Streamline plots showing the evolution of male
and female participation in warfare ð Vm, VfÞ when personal costs are decelerating and: effectiveness is greater for men than for women (bm . bf; a); men suffer
lower personal costs than women (cm , cf; b); women are less related to their same-sex group mates than men (rmm . rff; c) as a result of female-biased
dispersal; maternal admixture is greater than paternal admixture (Mm , Mf; d ). Filled red circles represent stable equilibria and circled blue dots represent unstable
equilibria. For the purposes of illustration, we assume a competitiveness functional form ti ¼ 1–xiV1=2i , and a symmetrical war outcome function
v(satt, sdef ) ¼ satt=ðsatt þ sdefÞ, where satt ¼ 1=2ðcmVm,att þ cfVf,attÞ and sdef ¼ 1=2ðcmVm,def þ cfVf,defÞ are the fighting strengths of
the attacker and the defender, respectively (see electronic supplementary material for details). Other parameter values are v ¼ 0:5, a ¼ 1, Nf ¼ Nm ¼ 10,
cf ¼ cm ¼ 1 (except panel a: cf ¼ 0.7, cm ¼ 1), xf ¼ xm ¼ 0.12 (except panel b: xf ¼ 0.14, xm ¼ 0.1), mf ¼ mm ¼ 0.2 (except panel c: mf ¼ 0.3,
mm ¼ 0.1), sf ¼ sm ¼ 0.15 (except panel d: sf ¼ 0.3, sm ¼ 0). (Online version in colour.)
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iour. To address this issue, we examine condition (1) to
assess whether sex differences in various underlying par-
ameters may bias this evolutionary exaggeration towards
exclusively male participation rather than exclusively female
participation. In support of the aforementioned hypotheses,
we find that certain sex differences may result in a greater
number of men than women participating in warfare (see elec-
tronic supplementary material for details). Moreover, we find
that these sex differences may act in conjunction with the hys-
teresis effect described above to drive the evolution of
exclusively male war parties, with no women participating.
Specifically, the basin of attraction for male-only participationis larger than that for female-only participation if men are
more effective than women in war (bm. bf; figure 2a), if the
cost of warfare is less for men than for women (cm , cf;
figure 2b), or if women disperse at a greater rate than do men
(resulting in women being less related to same-sex group
mates than men, rff, rmm; figure 2c). In each of these scenarios
the left-hand side of condition (1) is larger for men than for
women, tilting participation in their favour and making this
outcome more likely (see electronic supplementary material
for details). That is, starting from initially unbiased partici-
pation (for example, no participation by either sex), the
population is expected to embark on an evolutionary trajectory
that ultimately results in exclusively male warfare.
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make exclusively male warfare more likely than exclusively
female warfare. This obtains when the mothers of children
born into a defeated group represent a mixture of women
from winning and defeated groups (‘maternal admixture’
[23]) to an extent that is greater than for the fathers (‘paternal
admixture’ [23]) of these children (sf(12 sf ) . sm(12 sm)).
This occurs, for example, when all men in defeated groups
are killed and father no further children (sm ¼ 0) but some
of the women are spared and go on to produce children
(0, sf, 1). In such scenarios, a man who loses reproductive
opportunities by participating in warfare is relatively more
likely to reduce competition for reproductive opportunities
among his male group mates, from which he may derive
an indirect-fitness benefit, but a woman who loses reproduc-
tive opportunities by participating in warfare is relatively
more likely to reduce competition among unrelated women
in other groups. Accordingly, the left-hand side of condition
(1) is larger for men than it is for women and, accordingly,
the basin of attraction for male-only participation is larger
than that for female-only participation (figure 2d ). Again,
this means that a population that initially exhibits unbiased
participation is expected to evolve to a condition of
exclusively male warfare.4. Discussion
Our primary aimwas to explore why humanwarfare has been
not just a predominantly male activity but a near-exclusively
male activity. To address this question, we developed and
analysed a model of the co-evolution of male and female
participation in warfare. Taken together, our results sug-
gest an entirely novel explanation for why women do not
participate in warfare. Archaeological, ethnographic, and
historical evidence overwhelmingly show that warfare was
an almost-exclusively male activity in prehistoric societies
[24,26,27,29,30] and continued to be so in historical times in
both small-scale societies and states throughout the ancient
and modern world [4,9,17,29,31–35]. Although women
fought occasionally in North-American and Melanesian tribes
[34], in Scythian and Sarmatian steppe pastoralists—who may
be linked to the Greek myth of the Amazons [31]—in the
African Kingdom of Dahomey [58], and in Viking raiding par-
ties [59], there is no evidence of war being a predominantly or
exclusively female activity in any human society. We have
shown that this pattern may be explained by an evolutionary
feedback between male and female participation in warfare—
specifically, increased participation of one sex incentivizing
the same sex and disincentivizing the other—revealing that
sex itself is a fundamental modulator of involvement in inter-
group conflict. This effect ultimately owes to the way in
which competition for Darwinian fitness is only between indi-
viduals of the same sex, and hence is not specific to our
model but applies over a wide range of assumed societal
organizations, generational differences, andmigration patterns.
Considering only for illustration a simple hypothetical case
with no sex difference in any underlying parameter (i.e. males
and females are equally effective in war, pay equal costs of
participation in war, gain equal direct benefits and indirect
benefits to groupmates, andmigratewith equal rates), the evol-
ution of male-only participation requires only two conditions
be met: (i) that personal costs decelerate with increasingparticipation of individuals of the same sex; and (ii) that there
is an initial symmetry-breaking male bias in participation.
As an example of a scenario leading to condition (i) being satis-
fied, consider that a man who leaves the group to participate in
warfare is less likely to be cuckolded by a group mate if his
group mates are also participating in warfare. Let us now con-
sider a potential scenario that would lead to condition (ii) being
met. If warfare’s origins lay in within-group aggression
occasionally spilling out to the between-group level, then any
pre-existing male bias in aggression—driven, for example, by
standard sexual selection [60]—would have provided such an
initial symmetry-breaking and thus ensure that subsequently
evolving warfare behaviours were exclusively male in their
expression. Thus, the empirically observed pattern of warfare
being not just male-biased but, in most cases, an exclusi-
vely male activity can be explained under a very generally
applicable set of circumstances.
Let us digress slightly to extend the line of reasoning related
towarfare potentially having roots inwithin-group aggression.
Warfare might therefore be conceptualized as a social inno-
vation that allows wasteful sexually selected conflict among
male group mates to be cooperatively redirected towards
men in other groups, to the advantage of all group members.
Beyond warfare, sexual feedbacks similar to those explored
here may have played a role in the context of other group-
beneficial social behaviours, such as communal care of infants
and hunting, and might therefore explain striking patterns of
sexual division of labour in ancestral—and to a certain extent
contemporary—human societies [61,62].
Returning to our key aim of explaining why warfare is not
just a predominantly male activity, but in most cases exclu-
sively male: we have shown that, while they are not required
for exclusively male warfare to evolve, any of a number of
underlying sex differences may make this outcome more
likely, by enlarging its basin of attraction, such that it encom-
passes initial conditions in which both sexes participate
equally (including neither sex participating at all). Three such
sex differences have previously been articulated in the litera-
ture. First, greater male than female effectiveness in warfare
may result in a man having a greater positive impact on the
probability of winning the war and a correspondingly greater
increase in the reproductive success of his group mates than
would a woman—in line with the rationale presented by Gat
[30]. Second, lower costs for men than women make male-
only participation more likely, as suggested by Low [17,38],
Gat [31], and van Vugt [9]. Third, female-biased dispersal
(patrilocality) increases the likelihood of male-only partici-
pation in two ways: it results in the indirect-fitness benefit
accrued by men via increased breeding success for their
group mates being greater for men than for women, as
suggested by Manson & Wrangham [36] and Low [38]; and it
also results in greater relaxation of kin competition for men
than for women. As well as these three previously posited fac-
tors, our analysis suggests a further one that has previously
been neglected: greater maternal than paternal admixture
results in participation in warfare relaxing kin competition
among men more than among women, thus making male-
only participation more likely (for a similar effect driving
sex-biased dispersal, see Micheletti et al. [23]).
Low [17,38] and Adams [32] have argued that while such
underlying sex differences may drive a male bias in partici-
pation in warfare, they fail to convincingly explain why
warfare is almost exclusively a male activity. Indeed, it was
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sis confirms this point: although each of these underlying
factors may induce a quantitative male bias in participa-
tion in warfare, we find that the qualitative observation that
participants in warfare are almost exclusively male is ulti-
mately explained by the fundamentally sex-specific nature of
Darwinian competition in sexual populations (men compete
with men, and women with women). That is, although it has
been suspected that underlying sex differences might not
be sufficient to explain the evolution of exclusively male war-
fare, our analysis has shown that such sex differences are not
even necessary.
The results of our model may also be applicable beyond
humans. There is much controversy over the definition of war-
fare and, accordingly, as to which species should be regarded
as exhibiting warfare behaviours [8,13,37]. However, the only
vertebrates to have been observed to regularly engage in
lethal conflict between conspecific groups are chimpanzees,
spotted hyenas, wolves, and lions [37]. Our results offer a
novel explanation for why, in chimpanzees, both attackers
and victims are almost always male [11,33,37], and suggest
that male philopatry—generally considered to be crucial in
determining this pattern [36]—may simply be a reinforcing
factor (along with other sex differences, such as in ranging pat-
terns [63]). In spotted hyenas, only females participate in raids
against other groups [37,64], and this suggests that the sexual
feedbacks occurring in our model may apply in this case
such that an initial female bias (e.g. in aggressiveness) might
have led to female-only participation. Conversely, in wolves
and lions, both sexes appear to take part in intergroup raids
(though not necessarily in equal numbers [37,65,66]) which,
in light of our analysis, suggests that personal costs might
accelerate—rather than decelerate—with participation in
these species. Finally, coalitionary killing is relatively
common in many eusocial insects but, as their social systems
(e.g. involving non-reproductive castes) and the modes and
aims of their conflicts (e.g. attacking or defending against het-
erospecifics [67–70]) are fundamentally different from those
considered in our analysis, it is not clear that our results
would be applicable to those systems.
Returning to our own species, in addition to explaining the
evolutionary origins of exclusively male warfare, our analysis
may illuminate the biology of societally damaging violence-
related pathologies in contemporary populations. Crespi &
Badcock [71] have suggested that mutations and epimutations
at loci controlling adaptive aggression behaviours may be
linked with severe, psychotic-spectrum disorders, owing to
the destabilizing effects of intragenomic conflict between an
individual’s maternal-origin versus paternal-origin genes,
and Faria et al. [72] have pointed out that if adaptive aggression
behaviours are sex-limited in their expression, then concomi-
tant violence disorders are also expected to be sex-limited,
perhaps explaining their higher incidence in men than inwomen. Crespi & Badcock [71] assumed that aggression is pri-
marily a selfish, group-detrimental behaviour and, on that
basis, predicted that psychotic-spectrum disorders are likely
to be induced by deleteriousmutations inherited from the indi-
vidual’s mother. However, if aggression has been primarily a
selfless, group-beneficial behaviour—as in the case of partici-
pation in intergroup warfare—then the opposite pattern of
parent-of-origin-specific expression is expected [23]. Moreover,
the present analysis underlines why such pathologies may be
male-biased in their incidence, i.e. owing to our species’
almost-exclusively male participation in warfare.
Finally, our results may help illuminate the evolutionary
trajectories of warfare as societies have changed and become
more complex. Specifically, the presence of hysteresis—i.e.
dependence on initial conditions and subsequent historical
dynamics—mightmean that, after an evolutionary equilibrium
corresponding to a given set of initial biological and ecological
conditions has been reached, the population is unlikely to
move from that state, even if the conditions subsequently
change. For example, in a society with male-only participa-
tion in warfare—which ancestrally had lower costs for men,
female-biased migration and/or greater male effectiveness—
almost-exclusively male involvement in warfare is likely to
persist even if evolutionary innovations abolish sex differences
in costs, effectiveness, and rates of migration. This might
explain why war is almost exclusively the domain of men
even in societies characterized by monogamy (in which there
is less scope for men to enjoy limitless mating success) and in
matrilocal, duolocal, and neolocal populations in which dis-
persal is not female-biased (e.g. Tibetan small-scale societies
[73,74]). In addition, it suggests an explanation for why
women did not participate more in warfare with the introduc-
tion of weapons that appear to decrease male advantage, such
as the bow and arrow [18,31,32]. Similarly, the observation that
in contemporary industrialized societieswomen’s involvement
in the armed forces is still considerably limited—though fire-
power and digitalization have, in many ways, equalized the
sexes in terms of effectiveness in warfare [31]—need not be
entirely due to cultural or ideological reasons, but might
simply be a consequence of how ecological conditions faced
by our ancestors have shaped our biology.
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